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Snapback, Version 2.0: The Best Solution
to the Problem of Snap Removal
Arthur D. Hellman
Abstract
The forum defendant rule, embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), prohibits removal
of civil actions based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction “if any of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought.” Pointing to the phrase “properly joined and served,” defendants have
argued that § 1441(b)(2) does not bar removal of a diversity action if a citizen of the
forum state has been joined as a defendant but has not yet been served. The stratagem
of removing before service to avoid the prohibition of § 1441(b)(2) is known as “snap
removal.” Two courts of appeals and many district judges have held that snap removal is
permissible; other district judges have held that it is not.
On November 14, 2019, the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and
the Internet of the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing to examine the practice of
snap removal. Three of the four witnesses agreed that snap removals are contrary to
the intent of Congress as manifested in the forum defendant rule and that action by
Congress is needed to close the loophole. Two different kinds of action were suggested.
Professor James Pfander offered three proposals, each of which would require amending
the text of an existing subsection of the Judicial Code. I offered one proposal, a
standalone addition to the Code that would create what has been called a “snapback”
mechanism.
The snapback mechanism is designed to operate as a kind of time machine. It
sends the parties back to where they were at the moment before the defendant snapremoved, and it gives the plaintiff a chance to complete the service of process that
would have prevented the removal under § 1441(b)(2). The case stays in federal court
only long enough for the plaintiff to take the steps that will allow the case to return to
state court, where all further proceedings will take place.
I believe that the snapback mechanism will address the problem described at the
hearing without opening new loopholes or generating uncertainty about other aspects
of removal practice. In contrast, each of the alternative proposals would create serious
risks of reopening settled law and disrupting removal practice in ways that cannot be
anticipated.
On February 7, 2020, Rep. Henry C. “Hank” Johnson, Jr., Chairman of the
Subcommittee, introduced H.R. 5801, the “Removal Jurisdiction Clarification Act of
2020. H.R. 5801 embodies a revised version of the snapback proposal outlined at the
hearing.
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This supplementary statement addresses the major issues raised at the hearing.
Part I analyzes the proposals offered by Professor Pfander. Part II offers a revised
version of the snapback proposal, with commentary on the policy and drafting choices
that it reflects. Part III responds briefly to the arguments made by the hearing witness
who disputed the need for legislative action. In particular, the statement discusses the
counterpart stratagem used by plaintiffs to defeat removal – artful or “fraudulent”
joinder of non-diverse or forum defendants. I suggest that Congress should address
both problems in a way that respects the purpose of the constitutionally authorized
diversity jurisdiction. Part IV addresses Professor Pfander’s tentative suggestion that
Congress “assign some authority over the details of removal and remand procedure to
a rule-making body within the Judicial Conference of the United States.”
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On February 4, 2020, Representative Henry C. “Hank” Johnson, Jr., the Chairman of the
Subcommittee, invited me to submit “additional points or submissions … in response to the
questions asked at the hearing.” This Supplementary Statement responds to that invitation.
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Introduction and Summary
The forum defendant rule, embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), prohibits
removal of civil actions based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction “if any of the
parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the
State in which such action is brought.” Pointing to the phrase “properly joined
and served,” defendants have argued that § 1441(b)(2) does not bar removal of a
diversity action if a citizen of the forum state has been joined as a defendant but
has not yet been served. The stratagem of removing before service to avoid the
prohibition of § 1441(b)(2) is known as “snap removal.” Two courts of appeals
and many district judges have held that snap removal is permissible; other district
judges have held that it is not.
On November 14, 2019, the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Internet of the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing to
examine the practice of snap removal.1 Three of the four witnesses agreed that
snap removals are contrary to the intent of Congress as manifested in the forum
defendant rule and that action by Congress is needed to close the loophole.2
Two different kinds of action were suggested. Professor James Pfander outlined
three proposals, each of which would require amending the text of an existing
subsection of the Judicial Code. 3 I offered one proposal, a standalone addition to
the Code that would create what has been called a “snapback” mechanism.
The snapback mechanism is designed to operate as a kind of time machine.
It sends the parties back to where they were at the moment before the
defendant snap-removed, and it gives the plaintiff a chance to complete the
service of process that would have prevented the removal under § 1441(b)(2).
The case stays in federal court only long enough for the plaintiff to take the steps

1

This supplementary statement assumes familiarity with the issue as discussed in the
statements submitted for the hearing record. All of the statements, as well as a webcast of the
hearing, can be found at https://judiciary.house.gov/legislation/hearings/examining-use-snapremovals-circumvent-forum-defendant-rule. Parts I through III of my statement provide
background. See https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3489213.
2

The fourth witness disputed the existence of a problem requiring Congressional action.
For a brief response to his arguments, see infra Part III.
3

All references to Professor Pfander’s statement are to the text posted on the House
Judiciary Committee website.
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU03/20191114/110208/HHRG-116-JU03-Wstate-PfanderJ20191114.pdf.
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that will allow the case to return to state court, where all further proceedings
will take place.
I believe that the snapback mechanism will address the problem described
at the hearing without opening new loopholes or generating uncertainty about
other aspects of removal practice. In contrast, each of the alternative proposals
would create serious risks of reopening settled law and disrupting removal
practice in ways that cannot be anticipated.
On February 7, 2020, Rep. Henry C. “Hank” Johnson, Jr., Chairman of the
Subcommittee, introduced H.R. 5801, the “Removal Jurisdiction Clarification Act
of 2020.”4 H.R. 5801 embodies a revised version of the snapback proposal
outlined at the hearing.5
This supplementary statement addresses the major issues raised at the
hearing. Part I analyzes the proposals offered by Professor Pfander. Part II offers a
revised version of the snapback proposal, with commentary on the policy and
drafting choices that it reflects. Part III responds briefly to the arguments made by
the hearing witness who disputed the need for legislative action. Part IV
addresses Professor Pfander’s tentative suggestion that Congress “assign some
authority over the details of removal and remand procedure to a rule-making
body within the Judicial Conference of the United States.”
I. Text Editing or a Standalone Fix?
In his statement for the hearing, Professor Pfander offered three proposals
that he characterized as “preventative” approaches to snap removal.6 As already
noted, each of the three would require amending the text of an existing section
of the Judicial Code. Professor Pfander acknowledged that the text editing
approach implicates “the problem of unintended consequences” and runs “the
risk of inadvertently creating new problems.” That cautionary note applies to all
three of the “preventative” proposals in the statement. In addition, each of the
three is problematic in its own way.
4

The bill has 13 co-sponsors, including Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee.
5

For the text of the bill, see https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr5801/BILLS116hr5801ih.pdf.
6

Professor Pfander has authorized me to say that in his statement he was offering possible
approaches developed by others to be considered by the Committee. He was not necessarily
endorsing any of the proposals he described.
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A. Text editing and the risk of unintended consequences
As I suggested in my initial statement, any attempt to change the law
through what might be called “text editing” – adding, deleting, or changing words
in existing statutory text – runs a serious risk of inadvertently unsettling other
doctrines of removal law. Removal law is complex and interconnected. The
statutory language provides only a framework; most of the law is contained in a
vast corpus of decisions, many of which deal with issues that remain almost
invisible because they have never reached the Supreme Court.
The dangers inherent in the text-editing approach are exemplified by a
recent development involving the Removal Clarification Act of 2011. A
“conforming amendment” that was part of the Act inserted three words – “or
relating to” – into the preexisting text of the federal officer removal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The purpose of adding the three words was very narrow:
to clarify that state pre-suit discovery proceedings are removable even
though the state proceeding is not technically “for” the conduct of a
federal officer performing his or her official work, but merely seeks
information from the federal officer, that is, the proceeding is a of a type
that “relates to” the conduct of a federal officer.7
That limited purpose was understood by all participants in the drafting process
and was made explicit at the hearing on a predecessor bill.8 The language was
reviewed by two law professors (including myself), the General Counsel of the
House of Representatives, and a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
Department of Justice. No one thought that the bill, or the three-word insertion,
would do more than fix the narrow problem that was the subject of the hearing.
Indeed, the principal drafter of the bill emphasized that “[t]he bill leaves in place
the current law and practices governing federal officer removal in nearly all
respects.”9
Notwithstanding this careful process, several courts have interpreted the
three-word insertion to effect a significant expansion of the right of removal,
7

En Banc Amicus Curiae Brief of U.S. Congressman Henry C. “Hank” Johnson, Jr., in
Support of Appellee and Affirmance at 10, Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., No. 18-30652 (5th
Cir. July 12, 2019). Rep. Johnson was the sponsor of the bill.
8

See id. at 10-12 (summarizing statements at hearing).

9

H.R. 5281, “Removal Clarification Act of 2010”: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Courts and Competition Policy of the House Committee on the Judiciary at 16 (2010)
(statement of Irving Nathan).
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available not only to government officials, but also to government contractors.10
There could not be a better illustration of the “unintended consequences” that
can flow from revising a longstanding statutory text. Congress should not pursue
that approach when a narrowly tailored fix is available, as it is here.
B. Three text-editing proposals
Apart from the general concern about unintended consequences, each of
the proposals outlined by Professor Pfander raises problems of its own.
1. Deleting the service requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b)(2)
The first proposal discussed by Professor Pfander is to delete the words
“and served” from the phrase “properly joined and served” in § 1441(b)(2).
Preliminarily, Professor Pfander’s cautionary note about unintended
consequences applies in full force to this suggestion. The language in question –
“properly joined and served” – has been part of the statute for more than 70
years.11 Hundreds of decisions have interpreted it. No one can be certain which
judicial constructions would be called into question if the language were altered.
It is simply not possible to turn the clock back to 1948, before the current
wording was adopted, and restore whatever understanding may have existed of
the words “properly joined” without “and served.”
But it is not necessary to rely solely on the risk of unintended
consequences, because there are also particular reasons for not abrogating the
service requirement in § 1441(b)(2). As the Third Circuit explained, Congress
adopted the “properly joined and served” language “to prevent a plaintiff from
blocking removal by joining as a defendant a resident party against whom it does
not intend to proceed, and whom it does not even serve.”12 Deleting the words
“and served” would encourage the gamesmanship that Congress intended to
prevent when it added the words in 1948.
Moreover, abrogating the service requirement of § 1441(b)(2) would not
necessarily eliminate litigation over compliance with the forum defendant rule, at

10

See Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 918 F.3d 406, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2019) (Jones, J.
concurring) (citing cases), rehearing en banc granted, 923 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 2019).
11

The wording of the statute was changed by the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act of 2011, but the phrase “properly joined and served” was retained intact.
12

Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Restaurant Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 153 (3rd Cir. 2018)
(citation omitted).
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least where the plaintiff sues both forum and non-forum defendants. To be sure,
in that situation, none of the defendants could attempt snap removal. But if the
plaintiff has asserted insubstantial or thinly grounded claims against the forum
defendant, the out-of-state defendant might remove anyway based on an
argument that the local defendant has been improperly – i.e. fraudulently – joined.13
Litigating that question is likely to be more difficult and costly than litigating snap
removal.14 Indeed, the Second Circuit made that very point:
Congress may well have adopted the “properly joined and served”
requirement in an attempt to both limit gamesmanship and provide a
bright-line rule keyed on service, which is clearly more easily
administered than a fact-specific inquiry into a plaintiff’s intent or
opportunity to actually serve a home-state defendant.15
Professor Pfander downplays the concern that deleting the “and served”
language “would encourage the assertion of more frivolous claims against
jurisdictional spoilers.” He believes that the fraudulent joinder doctrine will limit
“attempts by plaintiffs to join jurisdictional spoilers to prevent removal.” But in
making this argument, he explicitly assumes that to defeat removal when the
defendant asserts fraudulent joinder, “the plaintiff must assert substantial claims
against all of the [spoiler] parties.” (Emphasis added.) That is not the law in any

13

Although the fraudulent joinder doctrine is more frequently applied to defendants who
share citizenship with the plaintiff, it also comes into play when the “spoiler” is a citizen of the
forum state, and the doctrine is generally applied in the same way. As a district court in Missouri
observed a few years ago, “The standards for determining whether a resident defendant is
fraudulently joined are the same as the standards for determining whether a diversity-destroying
defendant is fraudulently joined.” Byrd v. TVI, Inc., 2015 WL 5568454 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 21, 2015)
(emphasis added). Accord, In re Ethicon, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., 2013 WL 6710345
at *3 n. 2 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 19, 2013) (“In Musewicz, the issue is diversity of citizenship, while in
Hammons and Delacruz, the issue is the home state defendant rule. However, the fraudulent
joinder analysis remains the same in both instances.”); Aguayo v. AMCO Ins. Co., 59 F. Supp. 3d
1225, 1257 (D. N.M. 2014) (“the Court sees no principled reason to limit fraudulent-joinder
doctrine’s application to the joining of nondiverse parties to defeat complete diversity, while
excluding the functionally identical practice of fraudulently joining forum-citizen defendants to
defeat the forum-defendant rule.”). But see Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2012)
(questioning equivalence but not deciding the issue).
14

In some cases in which courts have allowed snap removal, the court noted that it did not
need to address the defendant’s alternative argument that the “spoiler” had been fraudulently
joined. E.g., Howard v. Crossland Const. Co., 2018 WL 2463099 at *3 (N.D. Okla. June 1, 2018);
Pathmanathan v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 2015 WL 4605757 at *5 n.1 (M.D. Ala. July 30, 2015).
15

Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 706 (2nd Cir. 2019)
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circuit. Far from it; typically the defendant must show that there is “no
possibility” that state law would impose liability on the spoiler. 16 The fraudulent
joinder doctrine thus provides little protection against the assertion of
insubstantial claims against a spoiler as a means of precluding removal through the
forum defendant rule.17
It would be a serious mistake for Congress to abandon the “bright-line rule
keyed on service” in order to combat abuse of the rule by a relatively small
number of defendants. The far better approach is to enact a standalone provision
that limits snap removal without encouraging gamesmanship by plaintiffs or
disrupting other aspects of removal law.
2. Making the forum defendant rule jurisdictional
The second proposal offered by Professor Pfander is to make the forum
defendant rule jurisdictional – “to fram[e] the barrier to removal of cases
involving forum defendants in jurisdictional terms.” If that were done, he explains,
the forum defendant rule would “resemble the jurisdictional rule of complete
diversity, which operates as a barrier to removal that snap removal cannot
overcome.”
This would be a substantial change from current law, and in my view a
highly undesirable one. In all but one of the ten circuits to have considered the
question, the courts of appeals have held that the forum defendant rule is not
jurisdictional.18 Although the courts have decided the question as one of
statutory construction, they have also adverted to policy concerns. For example,
16

See, e.g., Henderson v. Washington Nat’l Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“we may deny the motion [to remand a case on fraudulent grounder grounds] only if the
defendants have proven by clear and convincing evidence … that there is no possibility that
[plaintiff] can establish a cause of action against the resident defendant”) (cleaned up) (emphasis
in original); In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 217 (3rd Cir. 2006) (“if there is even a possibility that a
state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the resident
defendants, the federal court must find that joinder was proper and remand the case to state
court”) (emphasis added). Even under the Innocent Party Protection Act, passed by the House
in 2017, the defendant would have to show that the claim against the spoiler was “not plausible.”
See H.R. 725, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017). That certainly would not require the plaintiff to show that
the claim was “substantial.”
17

For further discussion of fraudulent joinder, see infra Part III.

18

See Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases).
The outlier is the Eighth Circuit. See Horton v. Conklin, 431 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2005); see
also infra note 20.
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as the Ninth Circuit observed, a procedural characterization of the forum
defendant rule honors the purpose of the rule, “because the plaintiff can either
move to remand the case to state court within the 30–day time limit [of §
1447(c)], or allow the case to remain in federal court by doing nothing. Either
way, the plaintiff exercises control over the forum.”19
Making the forum defendant rule jurisdictional would mean that the rule
could never be waived or forfeited, no matter how late in the litigation the
presence of a forum defendant was discovered.20 It would be equally irrelevant
that one of the parties had deliberately concealed facts relating to its
citizenship.21 A rigid rule of that kind would be particularly troublesome in an era
when litigation often involves unincorporated associations, whose citizenship is
determined by the citizenship of each of its members.22 There are LLCs whose
members are LLCs, and so forth up the chain.23 It would be extremely inefficient
if, after years of litigation, the parties had to start all over again because no one
had previously realized that one ultimate non-LLC member was a citizen of the
forum state.24
As with the first proposal in Professor Pfander’s statement, this one would
affect a wide range of cases in which no defendant is abusing the forum defendant
rule. Congress should not take that step unless there is no other way to combat
the abuse.

19

Lively, 456 F.3d at 940.

20

See Doe XY v. Shattuck-St. Mary’s School, 2015 WL 269034 *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 21, 2015)
(plaintiff asserted that violation of forum defendant rule was harmless, and he did “not object to
remaining in federal court,” but court found that “remand cannot be avoided” because Eighth
Circuit treats the forum defendant rule as jurisdictional).
21

See Owen Equipment Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 n.21 (1978) (“Our holding is that the
District Court lacked power to entertain the respondent’s lawsuit against the petitioner. Thus,
the asserted inequity in the respondent’s alleged concealment of its citizenship is irrelevant.”).
22

See, e.g., Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2010).

23

See id. (noting that “where an LLC has, as one of its members, another LLC, the
citizenship of unincorporated associations must be traced through however many layers of
partners or members there may be to determine the citizenship of the LLC”) (cleaned up).
24

I recognize that a proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(currently in the public-comment stage) would require a party in a case based on diversity
jurisdiction to disclose the citizenship of “every individual or entity whose citizenship is
attributed to that party at the time the action is filed.” Even if the rule is adopted, complex
ownership arrangements could still result in inadvertent mischaracterizations of citizenship.
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3. Prohibiting removal before service
The third text-editing proposal is that Congress amend § 1446 to prohibit
removal before the removing defendant has been served. This suggestion – which
Professor Pfander credits to Professor Kevin Clermont of Cornell Law School –
would, like the others, constitute a sharp departure from current law. The Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit, in a thorough opinion four years ago, found that
“every one” of the federal courts to consider the question since the Supreme
Court construed the statute in 199925 had concluded “that formal service is not
generally required before a defendant may file a notice of removal.”26
Professors Clermont and Pfander seem to suggest that prohibiting removal
before service would be easy to implement, but I do not think that is so. The
limitation would be an amendment to either § 1446(a) or § 1446(c)(2).27
Congress would have to integrate the new prohibition with the carefully
constructed timing scheme enacted in the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act of 2011 (JVCA). I helped to draft the JVCA, and I can testify that
it took quite a bit of effort to get all of the moving parts in § 1446 to fit together.
The task would be even more complex if Congress had to consider another set
of moving parts for the starting dates for the removal periods. And the greater
the complexity, the higher the likelihood that the drafters will miss some
combination of circumstances and create new problems and litigation points
down the line.
The prospect of unintended consequences looms especially large because
the proposed amendment to § 1446(a) would not be limited in its application to
snap removals. The new prohibition would apply to all diversity removals, all
federal question removals, and indeed to federal officer removals under § 1442.
To be sure, Professors Clermont and Pfander contemplate that the restriction
might be limited to diversity suits. Yet even if that were done, the new law would
still apply not only to evasive defendants like the medical device companies
whose stratagems were described at the hearing, but also to defendants with
completely legitimate grounds for removal who have a right to be in federal court
and want to get there as soon as possible.
25

See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999).

26

Novak v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. N.A., 783 F.3d 910, 914 (1st Cir. 2015).

27

The professors suggest the latter as a means of limiting the change to diversity suits, but
the primary proposal is an amendment to § 1446(a), applicable to all removals of civil actions.
See discussion infra.
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It would be a great mistake for Congress to change the law and impose this
new limitation on all defendants – or even all defendants in diversity cases –
because a relatively small number of defendants have arguably abused the system
in a narrow and discrete category of cases. (Not only narrow and discrete, but
atypical – atypical in that the plaintiff has chosen to bring suit outside his or her
home state.)28 The better approach is to craft a precisely tailored fix that will
solve the problem of snap removal without changing – or even raising questions
about – other aspects of removal practice.
C. Prevention and cure
In his written statement and again in his testimony at the hearing, Professor
Pfander invoked the adage that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure.” I have worked with Professor Pfander on other projects, and I have great
respect for him as a Federal Courts scholar. But I think that this suggestion is off
the mark in two respects.
First, the adage about an ounce of prevention is certainly good advice in
some circumstances – but not always. If the preventive medicine will have side
effects, and you don’t know how many people will experience them, or how bad
they will be, it may be better to rely on the cure.
Second, and contrary to the premise of the Professor Pfander’s comment, I
think the snapback proposal will have substantial preventive effects. A defendant
like the medical device manufacturer whose maneuvers were described at the
hearing may be willing to direct its process receiver to hide from the process
server for two or three hours. But would the corporation send the employee
into hiding for two or three days? Or for two or three weeks? When at the end
of that time the plaintiff will serve process and under the snapback provision the
court must remand?
Such behavior would not only be futile; it would also risk antagonizing the
federal judges in the corporation’s home state. So I think that if the snapback
provision is in effect, it will prevent most if not all snap removals. I turn now to
the details of the snapback mechanism.

28

See infra Part III.

February 18, 2020

Hellman – Snap Removal Supp – Page 10

II. Snapback: The Preferable Solution
The preferable legislative response to snap removal is a standalone addition
to the Judicial Code that would allow the plaintiff to counter the stratagem by
serving one or more in-state defendants after removal. Under this proposal, if the
plaintiff takes that step within 30 days (or within the time for service under state
law, if that is shorter) and moves to remand within the 30-day period specified by
current § 1447(c), the district court must send the case back to state court.
The proposed solution has been called the “snapback.”29 It closes a
loophole that Congress did not anticipate, without creating new loopholes or
raising questions about other aspects of removal practice. Except for a minor
conforming amendment, it makes no changes in the existing law of removal.30 In
particular:
• The forum defendant rule is retained in its present form. It prevents
removal if even one properly joined and served defendant is a citizen
of the forum state.
• If a defendant removes in violation of the forum defendant rule, the
plaintiff can secure remand under § 1447(c), as the plaintiff can do
today.
• If the plaintiff is content to stay in federal court, the plaintiff can
complete service under 28 U.S.C. § 1448, again in accordance with
current practice.31
All that is new is that the plaintiff can secure remand in the narrow class of
situations where an in-state defendant has been properly joined, but the
defendant removes before any in-state defendant has been properly served. 32
The proposal is based in large part on the draft legislation included in an
article authored by five Federal Courts scholars and published in the Federal

29

As noted in my hearing statement, credit for suggesting this term goes to Professor
Steven Gensler of the University of Oklahoma Law School.
30

The new subsection would implicitly confirm that the forum defendant rule is not
jurisdictional. This would codify decisional law in all but one of the circuits to have considered
the question. For discussion, see infra Parts I-A-1 & II-A-3.
31

For discussion of § 1448, see infra Part II-B.

32

Other advantages of the snapback approach are outlined in Part IV-C of my hearing
statement. I will not repeat that discussion here.

February 18, 2020

Hellman – Snap Removal Supp – Page 11

Courts Law Review in 2016.33 The proposal has been modified in several
respects to address concerns expressed at the hearing and in post-hearing
discussions.34
The proposal includes three elements: a new subsection to be added to 28
U.S.C. § 1447, the Judicial Code section that deals with procedures after removal;
a conforming amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1448; and an “effective date” provision.
A. New subsection in 28 U.S.C. § 1447
The principal element of the proposed fix is a new subsection (f) to be
added at the end of 28 U.S.C. § 1447. It would read as follows.
(f) Removal before service on forum defendant
(1) This subsection shall apply to any case in which
(A) a civil action was removed solely on the basis of the
jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title, and
(B) at the time of removal, one or more parties in interest
properly joined as defendants were citizens of the state in which
such action was brought, but no such defendant had been
properly served.
(2) The court shall remand the civil action described in paragraph
(1) to the state court from which it was removed if –
(A) within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal
under section 1446(a), or within the time specified by state law
for service of process, whichever is shorter, a defendant
described in subparagraph (1)(B) is properly served in the
manner prescribed by state law, and
(B) a motion to remand is made in accordance with, and
within the time specified by, the first sentence of subsection (c).
Three aspects of this proposal deserve attention: the structure of the new
subsection in 28 U.S.C. § 1447; policy choices that differ from those in the
original proposal; and drafting choices.

33

See Arthur D. Hellman, Lonny Hoffman, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Joan Steinman, &
Georgene Vairo, Neutralizing the Stratagem of “Snap Removal”: A Proposed Amendment to the
Judicial Code, 9 Fed. Courts L. Rev. 103 (2016).
34

See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
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1. Structure of the proposed new subsection
The proposed new subsection contains two numbered paragraphs.
Paragraph (1) describes the class of cases in which the snapback is permitted, and
paragraph (2) specifies the actions by the plaintiff and the district court that will
send the case back to state court.
The description in paragraph (1) is narrow and precise; it targets only the
class of cases in which defendants have attempted snap removal. Because it is set
off in a separate paragraph, it will make the provision easy to find. Because it is so
narrow, it reduces to an absolute minimum the likelihood of inadvertently
changing the law applicable to other cases.
Paragraph (2) delineates the two actions the plaintiff must take to invoke
the snapback – serving one in-state defendant and making a motion to remand –
and makes clear that if the plaintiff takes those steps within the time periods
specified, the district court must remand the case to the state court from which
it was removed.
Conversely, if the plaintiff does not take both steps within the time period
specified, § 1447(f) gives the district court no authority to remand. The case is
then controlled by other provisions of Chapter 89. In particular, if the plaintiff is
content to litigate in federal court, all the plaintiff need do is to serve any
unserved defendants (forum or non-forum) in accordance with the law that is
otherwise applicable to removed cases.35 The case will then stay in federal court.
The availability of this last option necessarily establishes that the forum
defendant rule is not jurisdictional. As already noted, that position accords with
the decisions of all but one of the circuits that have considered the question.36 It
also represents sound policy in light of the purpose of diversity jurisdiction to
provide “a neutral forum for parties from different States.”37 By definition, the
forum defendant rule comes into play only when the plaintiff is not a citizen of
the forum state.38 To be sure, the plaintiff has filed the lawsuit in state court, but
35

See infra note 41 & Part II-B.

36

See supra Part I-B-2.

37

See Home Depot, Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (2019) (noting that diversity
jurisdiction provides “a neutral forum for parties from different States when the claims are
grounded in state law.”).
38

If the plaintiff is a citizen of the forum state, the complete-diversity requirement would
preclude a diversity suit against a forum defendant, and the forum defendant rule will be
irrelevant.
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if, after removal, the plaintiff prefers the neutral federal forum, there is no reason
not to accommodate that preference. As the Ninth Circuit commented in holding
that the forum defendant rule is not jurisdictional, allowing the plaintiff to
“exercise[] control over the forum” honors the purpose of the rule.39
2. Policy choices in the snapback provision
This version of the snapback proposal reflects two policy choices that
warrant discussion. These relate to the manner of service and the deadline for
perfecting the snapback. I believe that these policy choices – which as noted
earlier diverge from those in the original proposal – go far toward answering the
criticisms of that proposal made by Professor Pfander in his hearing statement.40
Manner of service. The proposed legislation requires the plaintiff to serve at
least one in-state defendant “in the manner prescribed by state law.” The
question arises: why not give the plaintiff the option of using the methods
available under federal law – specifically, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure? After all, 28 U.S.C. § 1448 gives plaintiff that option in the ordinary
run of removed cases.41
The answer is that the object of the snapback is to put the parties in the
position they would be if the defendant had not jumped the gun and removed
before service on the in-state defendant. If the defendant had not jumped the gun,
the plaintiff would of course have been required to comply with state methods of
service. It therefore seems desirable to adhere to that requirement in the
snapback.
Time limit for service. The proposed legislation requires the plaintiff to
serve an in-state defendant within 30 days of removal or within the time provided
by state law, whichever is shorter. Because it is not self-evident that that is the
best approach, it will be useful to explain why the requirement has been defined
in that way.
An alternative approach would require that an in-state defendant be served
within the same 30-day period specified in subparagraph (2)(B) for filing the
39

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

40

I appreciate the constructive criticisms by Professor Pfander and others, which have
resulted in a substantially improved proposal.
41

Section 1448 authorizes the plaintiff to complete service begun in state court or to have
“new process issued in the same manner as in cases originally filed in [the] district court.” For
further discussion of § 1448, see infra Part II-B.
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motion to remand. That would mean that in a state like New Jersey, where state
law requires service to be made within 15 days, the plaintiff would get more time
than state law allows. That seems counter to both federalism and efficiency. In
this setting, uniformity within the state is more important than uniformity
throughout the nation.
At the other end, there is no reason to give more time than 30 days for
service, even if state law would allow it. The view of the plaintiffs’ bar is that 30
days from snap removal is more than enough time to complete service and file
the motion to remand. If the plaintiffs’ bar is satisfied with 30 days, it is hard to
imagine anyone else arguing that the period should be extended.
Based on this reasoning, the new draft proposes that if a forum defendant is
properly served within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal, or within
the time allowed by state law for service of process, whichever is shorter, the
civil action will be subject to remand.
***
As noted at the outset, under the snapback proposal, the case stays in
federal court only long enough for the plaintiff to take the steps that will allow
the case to return to state court, where all further proceedings will take place. It
therefore makes sense to keep the involvement of federal law to a minimum.
That is the approach taken in this proposal with respect to both the timing and
the manner of service of process.
3. Drafting choices in the snapback provision
In drafting the proposed § 1447(f), the language has been chosen for
maximum integration with other provisions of Chapter 89, particularly the forum
defendant rule as embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) .
Subparagraph (1)(A). This subparagraph specifies the first-level category of
cases to which the paragraph applies. The language – “solely on the basis of the
jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title” – is taken verbatim from §
1441(b)(2). Two comments are in order. First, it is not clear that the words “of
this title” are necessary. Second, “under” could be replaced by “conferred by.”
Both changes would conform to the approach taken in the revision of 28 U.S.C. §
1446(c) by the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011.
However, since new § 1447(f) is so closely related to §1441(b)(2), it seems
preferable to use the formulation in the latter.
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Subparagraph (1)(B). This subparagraph specifies the subcategory of
diversity cases in which defendants have attempted snap removal: “at the time of
removal, one or more parties in interest properly joined as defendants were
citizens of the state in which such action was brought, but no such defendant had
been properly served.” Four drafting choices warrant comment.
First, the draft refers to “one or more parties in interest properly joined as
defendants.” This phrase slightly modifies the language of § 1441(b)(2), which
refers to “any of the parties in interest properly joined … as defendants.” It
would be possible to use the language of § 1441(b)(2) verbatim, but in this
context “one or more” seems clearer. Moreover, “‘one or more” fits better with
the final reference to “no such defendant,” discussed below.
Second, the draft refers to forum state citizenship “at the time of removal.”
The phrase is not included in § 1441(b)(2), but it is implicit because § 1441(b)(2)
is a limit on the removal itself. In contrast, proposed new § 1447(f) deals with
steps to be taken after removal. It seems prudent to make clear that what counts
is forum-state citizenship at the time of removal.
Third, the draft includes the phrase “but no such defendant had been
properly served.” This phrase is necessary for a complete definition of the
subcategory. If even one forum defendant has been served, there is no need to
invoke subsection (f); the forum defendant rule itself will bar the removal. It is
preferable to include the qualification to clearly define the universe of cases to
which the new provision applies.
Finally, the subsection applies only when no forum defendant has been
properly served. “Properly served” is the phrase used in § 1441(b)(2). If the
forum defendant rule treats improper service as tantamount to no service, the
snapback mechanism should do the same.42
Subparagraph (2)(A). This subparagraph requires that the defendant be
“properly served in the manner prescribed by state law.”
As already noted, “properly served” is the phrase used in § 1441(b)(2).
Since new subsection (f) is designed to protect the thrust of § 1441(b)(2), it
seems desirable to use the same language.
42

I have found very few cases in which a defendant has argued that removal was not
barred by the forum defendant rule because a forum defendant had not been properly served at
the time of removal. E.g., Crawford v. Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2019 WL 3288137 (D. N.J. Aug.
29, 2008) (holding that service was proper under state law, so forum defendant rule barred
removal).
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Some readers of earlier drafts suggested that “a manner” would be
preferable to “the manner.” The concern is that “the manner” would be read to
imply that there is only one way under state law to accomplish service. But if
state law, like Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifies different
procedures for different types of defendants or different types of claims, “a
manner” could be read as negating those specific directives. I think that “properly
served in the manner prescribed by state law” is naturally and plausibly read to
mean “properly served in the manner prescribed by state law for the particular
defendant and the particular claim.”
It should also be clear that “the manner” of service includes all procedural
aspects of service, e.g., who may or must serve process, whether service by email
or social media is permissible, or how service is to be made upon a corporation
or other entity. “Manner of service” excludes timing requirements, which are
specified in the first two phrases of subparagraph (2)(A).
Subparagraph (2)(B). This subparagraph requires that the motion to remand
be made “in accordance with, and within the time specified by, the first sentence
of subsection (c).”43 The first sentence of § 1447(c) provides: “A motion to
remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter
jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal
under section 1446(a).” The snapback thus conforms to the timing requirement
for motions to remand “on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.” This means that the plaintiff has 30 days to seek the remand.
The subparagraph also states that the remand motion must be made “in
accordance with” the first sentence of § 1447(c). This language should be read as
further confirming that the forum defendant rule is not jurisdictional. As noted
earlier, that conclusion is implicit in paragraph (2) as a whole, because the
remand order is conditioned on the plaintiff’s taking the two required steps
within the specified time.44 But explicitly referencing the first sentence of §
1447(c) reinforces the point.
It may be argued that “in accordance with” would include the 30-day
deadline in § 1447(c), so that it is unnecessary to also say “within the time
specified by.” But the short deadline is such an important part of the legislation
that it is desirable to specify it anyway.
43

This draft follows the model of § 1446 as revised by the JVCA and refers to “subsection
(c)” rather than § 1447(c).
44

See supra Part II-A-1.
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B. Conforming amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1448
The snap removal legislation should include a conforming amendment to 28
U.S.C. § 1448, which has the title “Process after removal.” Section 1448, by its
terms, applies, inter alia, to “all cases removed from any State court to any
district court … in which any one or more of the defendants has not been served
with process.” That phrase precisely describes the cases covered by new §
1447(f). But § 1448 allows service to be made “in the same manner as in cases
originally filed in [the] district court.” Under current law (Rule 4(m)), that would
give the plaintiff 90 days, not 30 days, to serve unserved defendants. It is
therefore necessary to amend § 1448 so that it would begin: “Except as provided
in section 1447(f), in all cases …”
Some readers of prior drafts have expressed the view that the proposed
conforming amendment is unnecessary. As I understand their position, it is that §
1448 is addressed to actions that will remain in federal court, while new § 1447(f)
is aimed at getting cases back to the state court in which they were filed. That is
true, but it does not change the fact that the permissive rule of § 1448, made
applicable to “all cases” in which a defendant has not been served at the time of
removal, is in conflict with the short deadline specified in § 1447(f) for the cases
within its ambit. It is therefore necessary to make clear that the permissive rule
of § 1448 does not apply to snap removal cases covered by § 1447(f).
Under new § 1447(f) and the conforming amendment, a plaintiff who is
content to stay in federal court would still have 90 days to serve process on the
in-state defendant. But if the plaintiff wants to use the snapback, he or she must
serve within the shorter period specified by § 1447(f)(2)(A).
C. Effective date provision
The snapback bill should include a section specifying the effective date of the
new provision. In the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of
2011, the amendments to Title 28 were made applicable to actions “commenced”
30 days after enactment; however, for removed cases, an action was deemed to
commence “on the date the action … was commenced, within the meaning of
State law, in State court.” (Emphasis added.) That is probably a good model for
legislation dealing with snap removal. Thus, the section might read: “The
amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon the expiration of the 30-day
period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to any
action commenced on or after such effective date. An action commenced in
State court and removed to Federal court shall be deemed to commence on the
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date the action or prosecution was commenced, within the meaning of State law,
in State court.”45
It may be possible to combine the two sentences into one, since the Act
applies only to cases removed from state to federal court. But that would
probably produce a cumbersome sentence.
There may be a concern that 30 days after enactment does not give
sufficient notice to the practicing bar. I do not think this will be a problem. As
noted in my hearing statement, snap removal situations will generally involve
savvy and knowledgeable attorneys on both sides. We can expect that the
attorneys would be following the progress of the snap removal legislation and
would be ready when it is enacted.
Out of caution, Congress might choose to delay the effective date so that it
would apply, for example, only to cases commenced in state court 60 days or
more after enactment. But I think that the 30 days specified in the JVCA is
sufficient.
III. A Brief Response to Lawyers for Civil Justice
As noted at the outset, three of the four witnesses at the hearing agreed
that snap removal is a problem and that legislative action is desirable. The fourth
witness was attorney Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, testifying on behalf of Lawyers for
Civil Justice, “a national coalition of law firms, corporations and defense trial
lawyer organizations that promotes excellence and fairness in the civil justice
system to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of civil cases.”46
Mr. Stoffelmayr argued that there is “no basis for doing away with the salutary
provision permitting pre-service removal when the anomalous results are
infrequent and can result in no injustice to the disappointed plaintiffs.” I will
comment on four of the points made by Mr. Stoffelmayr in support of this
position.

45

The JVCA’s effective-date provision referred to an “action or prosecution commenced
in State court …” The reference to prosecutions was necessary because the JVCA included
amendments to the provisions dealing with removal of criminal cases. No such reference is
needed for the snapback provision, which applies only to civil suits.
46

All references to Mr. Stoffelmayr’s statement are to the text posted on the House
Judiciary Committee website.
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU03/20191114/110208/HHRG-116-JU03-WstateStoffelmayrK-20191114.pdf.
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First, Mr. Stoffelmayr argued that “pre-service removal is relatively rare.”
He relied on an empirical study by Valerie Nannery published in 2018.47
However, as another witness, attorney Ellen Relkin, pointed out, the empirical
study looked only at cases removed to federal court “between January 1, 2012,
and December 31, 2014, before service on any defendant.”48 The cutoff period
for the study was thus more than five years ago. Ms. Relkin testified that the
incidence of snap removals has exploded in the years since then.
Ms. Relkin also pointed out that Ms. Nannery’s study period antedated the
two court of appeals decisions holding that snap removal is permissible.
Defendants in those circuits (including the Third Circuit, the epicenter of snap
removal even before the court of appeals ruling) now know that they will not
have to persuade a district judge to allow the removal.49 There is thus every
reason to believe that, without legislation, defendants will take advantage of the
stratagem whenever they are in a position to do so.
Second, Mr. Stoffelmayr emphasized that snap removal can become an issue
“only when the plaintiff, contrary to normal practice, has elected to file a lawsuit
in a state court outside of the plaintiff’s own home state.” He is quite correct
about that.50 But it is equally important to emphasize that the forum chosen is
the home state of the defendant. The Supreme Court, in several recent decisions,
has reiterated that defendants can always be sued in their home state no matter
where the claims arose.51 Moreover, the home state may be the only state where
plaintiffs from different states with similar claims can all join.52 Allowing the
plaintiffs to sue together in the defendant’s home state makes for efficiency.
47

See Valerie M. Nannery, Closing the Snap Removal Loophole, 86 U. Cin. L. Rev. 541 (2018).

48

Id. at 559.

49

District court decisions are not binding on other judges within the district. Whether
snap removal was allowed thus depended on which judge was drawn – typically by lot – to hear
the case.
50

See supra note 38.

51

See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (noting that the state of
incorporation and the state where the corporation has its principal place of business “afford
plaintiffs recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in which a corporate defendant may be
sued on any and all claims”) (emphasis added).
52

A Supreme Court decision in 2018 narrowed plaintiffs’ options in that respect. See
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2018) (holding that a California state
court could not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over claims by non-resident consumers
against a defendant incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York).
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Third, in response to a question at the hearing, I commented that the forum
defendant rule rests on the assumption that as long as there is at least one
defendant from the forum state, no defendant in the case needs protection from
bias at the hands of the state court. Snap removal, I said, is inconsistent with that
assumption. Mr. Stoffelmayr took issue with the assumption. He said that when
an out-of-state defendant is sued in state court, the fact that a small local business
or a local individual is also joined as a defendant will give only “cold comfort.” In
“actual practice,” he told the Subcommittee, the out-of-state defendant would
have little confidence that its interests would be protected in the same way that
they would be in federal court.53
I agree with Mr. Stoffelmayr that the assumption underlying the forum
defendant rule is open to question, particularly when the out-of-state defendant
is the primary defendant (for example, the manufacturer of the drug the plaintiff
ingested) and the in-state defendant is a local merchant or employee. The
problem is that any overlap between the circumstances that allow for snap
removal and those that would justify relaxing the forum defendant rule is
completely coincidental. For example, in the medical-device cases described by
Ms. Relkin, there is only one defendant, and that defendant is an in-state
corporation.54 As long as the forum defendant rule is retained in its present form,
it is hard to justify allowing ad hoc circumvention in situations where defendants
can monitor state-court dockets electronically or where state law does not allow
plaintiffs to perfect service quickly.55
Out-of-state defendants may have a legitimate grievance if, under current
law, plaintiffs can assert frivolous or insubstantial claims against an in-state
defendant and use those claims to frustrate the right of removal that an out-ofstate defendant would have if sued alone.56 If so, the solution is to reform the law
53

This exchange begins at about 1:06 in the webcast cited supra note 1.

54

That was also the situation in the Third Circuit case that held snap removal permissible.
See Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Restaurant Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 149 (3rd Cir. 2018).
55

As Professor Pfander put it, “[no] sensible system of jurisdictional allocation would
foreclose removal by forum defendants and then create an exception for nimble docketmonitoring forum defendants.”
56

In an article aimed at plaintiffs’ lawyers, the author stated: “Plaintiff attorneys too often
focus their attention on ‘target defendants,’ even though others may also be liable for their
clients’ injuries. … You should therefore consider suing [non-diverse defendants], regardless of
whether you anticipate receiving a substantial recovery from them, in order to keep your
lawsuit in state court.” Erik Walker, Keep Your Case in State Court, Trial, Sept. 2004, at 22.
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of fraudulent joinder, not to reject the snapback.57 There may be a kind of rough
justice if some defendants take advantage of snap removal while some plaintiffs
benefit from artful joinder.58 But two wrongs do not make a right, and Congress
should not be satisfied with rough justice. It should seek to enact carefully crafted
legislation that addresses each problem in a way that respects the purpose of the
constitutionally authorized diversity jurisdiction.
Finally, Mr. Stoffelmayr commented that there is “no … unfairness or
injustice that would justify rewriting statutory language that has served the courts
well for decades.” I agree with that also, and that is why I oppose the suggestions
outlined in Professor Pfander’s statement. But the snapback proposal would not
rewrite any statutory language; it would add a new, narrowly tailored provision
that would deal with snap removal without upsetting other aspects of removal
law.
IV. Clarifying the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Finding a Better Process
In his written statement and his oral testimony, Professor Pfander called
attention to the fact that snap removal is only one of many issues in removal
practice that have given rise to conflicting decisions in the lower courts.59 These
57

In 2016 and again in 2017, the House passed legislation aimed at modestly strengthening
the fraudulent joinder doctrine. See Innocent Party Protection Act, H.R. 725, 115th Cong.
(2017); H.R. Rep. 115-17 (2017).
58

The term “artful joinder” is used here because of the parallel to the doctrine of “artful
pleading.” The artful pleading doctrine embodies the principle that “a plaintiff may not defeat
removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S.
470, 475 (1998) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). In the cases referenced by Mr.
Stoffelmayr, the plaintiff seeks to defeat removal by joining unnecessary defendants – unnecessary
in this sense: if the plaintiff has a valid claim at all under the applicable law, he or she will
ordinarily be able to obtain full redress from other defendants, and in particular the out-of-state
corporation.
At the hearing in November 2019, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Rep. Martha
Roby, spoke in a similar vein. She said that plaintiffs often join non-diverse parties who “are not
necessary to the litigation and at times are only included to keep … a case in a state court that
maybe seems favorable to the plaintiff.” See https://www.law360.com/articles/1242121/newhouse-bill-fights-snap-removals-to-federal-court.
59

Professor Pfander gave as an example the question of what parties must do to consent
to removal under 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(2). See Crowther v. Mountain Productions, Inc., 2019 WL
3288137 *3-*4 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2019) (noting that four circuits “have held that a statement in
one defendant’s timely notice that its codefendant or codefendants have consented to removal
is sufficient,” but that three circuits have rejected that rule). Courts also disagree over what
constitutes an “other paper” that triggers the second removal window under § 1446(b)(3).
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unsettled issues add to delay, burden courts, and impose costs on the parties,
without advancing resolution of the underlying disputes. Professor Pfander
suggested that we “start a conversation about broadening the Rules Enabling Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2702, to assign some authority over the details of removal and
remand procedure to a rule-making body within the Judicial Conference of the
United States.”
I agree with Professor Pfander that the present process for addressing
problems in removal and remand procedure leaves much to be desired. Indeed,
the same can be said of federal jurisdiction generally, though removal is certainly
an area particularly in need of study and reform.60 I also agree with the
suggestion that Congress should look to the Judicial Conference of the United
States for assistance in addressing these matters.
Perhaps out of (unnecessary) modesty, Professor Pfander did not mention
that there already exists an entity within the Judicial Conference that is
empowered to study matters of federal jurisdiction and make recommendations
for amendments to the Judicial Code. That is the Committee on Federal-State
Jurisdiction;61 for several years, Professor Pfander served with distinction as
consultant to the Committee. The most far-reaching package of revisions to the
basic jurisdictional statutes since 1990 – the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and
Venue Clarification Act of 2011 (JVCA) – originated in a proposal presented by
the Committee at a hearing held by this Subcommittee in 2005. 62 The most

Compare Morgan v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 879 F.3d 602, 612 (5th Cir. 2018) (the “removal clock
begins ticking upon receipt of the deposition transcript”), with Huffman v. Saul Huffman Ltd.
Partnership, 194 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th Cir. 1999) (“the removal period commences with the
giving of the testimony, not the receipt of the transcript”).
60

A good example, not involving removal, is “the law around cross-appeals,” which a
recent commentator described as “still unclear, obscure and evolving.” Michael Soyfer, Patent
Decision Highlights Cross-Appeal Considerations, Law360, Dec. 3, 2019,
https://www.law360.com/articles/1224083/print?section=aerospace.
61

As a hierarchical matter, it should be noted that the Committee makes its
recommendations to the Judicial Conference, which must approve them before they can be
transmitted to Congress.
62

See Federal Jurisdiction Clarification Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2005)
[hereinafter JVCA Hearing]. Judge Janet Hall testified on behalf of the Judicial Conference
committee. I also testified. At that time, venue reform was not part of the proposed legislation.
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important components of the JVCA were those relating to removal jurisdiction
and procedure.63
Unfortunately, the current mode of operation of the Federal-State
Jurisdiction Committee includes several features that substantially diminish the
Committee’s effectiveness as a forum for identifying problems and proposing
solutions. The Committee itself is almost invisible. Neither its mission nor its
membership is described on the Judiciary website.64 The Committee makes no
public announcements of its agenda or its proposals. For example, after the 2005
hearing, when the Committee unveiled the first version of the bill that became
the JVCA, there was no further public disclosure of revised versions or of the
many issues that arose as the bill made its way to approval by Congress and the
President.65
The JVCA provides a good illustration of the possible consequences of a
closed process. At the 2005 hearing, the Judicial Conference offered a pair of
proposals that would have allowed a plaintiff to avoid removal based on diversity
jurisdiction by filing a “declaration” (i.e. stipulation) reducing the amount in
controversy below the minimum specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This was an
innovative approach that would have helped to “avoid needless litigation over the
proper forum for [a diversity] case.”66 But the provisions were deleted from the
final version of the bill because they had generated controversy.67 If the debate
63

See Arthur D. Hellman, The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act Is Now
Law, Jurist, Dec. 30, 2011, https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2011/12/arthur-hellman-jvca/.
64

A press release issued on October 1, 2019, announced that Chief Justice Roberts had
appointed a new chair, Judge D. Michael Fisher of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge
Fisher’s appointment was effective on the same day.
65

There was some vetting, but it was not public. As the House Judiciary Committee report
on the bill noted, the Administrative Office of US Courts (AO) functioned “as a clearinghouse
to vet the bill and newly-developed revisions to it with the Judicial Conference’s Federal-State
Jurisdiction Committee, academics, and interested stakeholders.” H.R. Rep. 112-10 at 2-3
(2011). But all of those communications were private, and lawyers and judges outside the tight
circle had no way of knowing even what issues were being contested, let alone what changes
were being made.
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See Arthur D. Hellman, The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act: Some
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had taken place out in the open, with a larger number of participants, it might
have been possible to find common ground, at least on a narrow version of the
idea.
I think there is a better way. This is not the place for a detailed proposal,
but here are some steps that the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee could take
that would enhance its ability to help Congress in addressing jurisdictional issues:
• The Committee could periodically announce its agenda – matters
that it is actively considering for possible recommendations.
• When a proposal has reached a sufficiently mature stage, the
Committee could post it on the Judiciary website and invite
comments.
• The Committee could invite judges, lawyers, and scholars to submit
suggestions about aspects of federal jurisdiction that have given rise
to confusion, conflict, or uncertainty in the lower courts.
• The Committee could establish a web page that would serve as a
forum for judges, lawyers, and other interested persons to discuss
jurisdictional problems and vet possible solutions.
Two caveats are in order. First, I am not suggesting that Congress should
delegate authority to the Judicial Conference to promulgate rules governing
matters of federal jurisdiction. There may be narrow issues on which delegation
is appropriate; for example, Congress has authorized the Supreme Court to
prescribe rules that “define when a ruling of a district court is final for the
purposes of appeal under [28 U.S.C. § 1291].”68 But when it comes to civil
litigation, even technical rules about district court jurisdiction may involve policy
choices that plaintiffs and defendants will view differently. Jurisdictional rules may
also implicate questions of federalism – the allocation of judicial power between
the national government and the states.69
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See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c). This provision was enacted in 1990. No rules of that kind have
been adopted. The 1990 law also authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate rules defining
new categories of interlocutory appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e). One such rule, authorizing
appeals from orders granting or denying class certification, has been adopted. See Rule 23(f) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Justice Felix Frankfurter liked to quote former Justice Benjamin Curtis: “[Q]uestions of
jurisdiction [are] questions of power as between the United States and the several States.” Irvin
v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 412 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Congress, as the representative branch of the national government, should
retain ultimate authority to decide what the law of federal jurisdiction will be. But
if the Judicial Conference submits proposed legislation that has been endorsed by
the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee after input from the bench and bar,
Congress could move forward with confidence that the hard issues have been
dealt with. Vetting by interest groups and scholars would also help to minimize
the prospect of unintended consequences.
Second, I would not suggest that the Committee on Federal-State
Jurisdiction should adopt the complete panoply of procedures followed today for
rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act. The Committee can borrow some
elements of that process, but there is no need for such an elaborate set of
protocols when the Committee would only be making recommendations to
Congress.
To continue the conversation that Professor Pfander invited, I will suggest
that a good first step would be for the Chairman and Ranking Member of this
Subcommittee to write to Chief Justice Roberts, in his capacity as Chair of the
Judicial Conference, expressing a desire that the Committee on Federal-State
Jurisdiction take on a more robust role in considering jurisdictional issues and
making recommendations to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. The
letter could specify some of the steps the Committee could take and perhaps
even identify some issues that have come to the Subcommittee’s attention. There
is precedent for such a letter; in 2002, after a hearing on the operation of the
federal judicial misconduct statutes, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee wrote to Chief Justice Rehnquist offering “recommendations … to
improve the operations of Article III courts and instill even greater confidence in
[the courts’] work.”70
That is a suggestion for the longer term. For now, I urge the Subcommittee
to move forward with the snapback legislation – a targeted measure that would
deal with a narrow problem without disrupting other aspects of removal practice
or foreclosing Congress’s options if it should want to consider more widely
applicable reforms in the future.
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The letter is reprinted in H.R. Rep. 107-459 at 16-18 (2002).
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